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Abstract
Recently, deep networks have achieved impressive se-
mantic segmentation performance, in particular thanks to
their use of larger contextual information. In this paper,
we show that the resulting networks are sensitive not only
to global attacks, where perturbations affect the entire in-
put image, but also to indirect local attacks where pertur-
bations are confined to a small image region that does not
overlap with the area that we aim to fool. To this end, we
introduce several indirect attack strategies, including adap-
tive local attacks, aiming to find the best image location to
perturb, and universal local attacks. Furthermore, we pro-
pose attack detection techniques both for the global image
level and to obtain a pixel-wise localization of the fooled
regions. Our results are unsettling: Because they exploit a
larger context, more accurate semantic segmentation net-
works are more sensitive to indirect local attacks.
1. Introduction
Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) are highly expressive
models and achieve state-of-the-art performance on many
computer vision tasks. In particular, the powerful back-
bones originally developed for image recognition have now
be recycled for semantic segmentation, via the development
of fully convolutional networks (FCNs) [26]. The success
of these initial FCNs, however, was impeded by their lim-
ited understanding of surrounding context. As such, re-
cent techniques have focused on incorporating contextual
information via dilated convolutions [43], pooling opera-
tions [24, 46], or attention mechanisms [47, 10].
Despite this success, recent studies have shown that
DNNs are vulnerable to adversarial attacks. That is, small,
dedicated perturbations to the input images can make a
network produce virtually arbitrarily incorrect predictions.
While this has been mostly studied in the context of im-
age recognition [31, 21, 7, 30, 34], a few recent works have
nonetheless discussed such adversarial attacks for semantic
segmentation [42, 2, 16]. These methods, however, remain
limited to global perturbations to the entire image. Here, we
argue that local attacks are more realistic, in that, in prac-
(a) Adversarial image (b) Ground Truth
(c) FCN [26] (d) PSPNet [46]
(e) PSANet [47] (f) DANet [10]
Figure 1: Indirect Local Attacks. An adversarial input
image (a) is attacked with an imperceptible noise in local
regions, shown as red boxes, to fool the dynamic objects.
Such indirect local attacks barely affects FCN [26] (c). By
contrast, modern networks that leverage context to achieve
higher accuracy, such as PSPNet [46] (d), PSANet [47] (e)
and DANet [10] (f) are more strongly affected, even in re-
gions far away from the perturbed area.
tice, they would allow one to modify the physical environ-
ment to fool a network. This, in some sense, was the task
addressed in [9], where stickers were placed on traffic poles
so that an image recognition network would misclassify the
corresponding traffic signs. In this scenario, however, the
attack was directly performed on the targeted object.
Here, by contrast, we study the impact of indirect lo-
cal attacks, where the perturbations are performed on re-
gions outside the targeted objects. This, for instance, would
allow one to place a sticker on the building such that the
nearby dynamic objects, such as cars and pedestrians, gets
mislabeled as the nearest background class. To this end, we
first investigate the general idea of indirect attacks, where
the perturbations can occur anywhere in the image except
on the targeted objects. We then switch to the more real-
istic case of localized indirect attacks, and design a group
sparsity-based strategy to confine the perturbed region to a
small area outside of the targeted objects. In addition, we
show the existence of a single universal fixed-size patch that
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can be learned from all training images to attack an entire
unseen image in an untargeted way.
The conclusions of our experiments are disturbing: In
short, more accurate semantic segmentation networks are
more sensitive to indirect local attacks. This is illustrated
by Figure 1, where perturbing few patches in a static re-
gion has much larger impact on the dynamic objects for the
context-aware PSPNet [46], PSANet [47] and DANet [10]
than for a simple FCN [26]. This, however, has to be ex-
pected, because the use of context, which improves segmen-
tation accuracy, also increases the network’s receptive field,
thus allowing the perturbation to be propagated to more dis-
tant image regions. Motivated by this unsettling sensitivity
of segmentation networks to indirect local attacks, we then
turn our focus to adversarial attack detection. In contrast
to the only two existing works that have tackled attack de-
tection for semantic segmentation [41, 23], we perform de-
tection not only at the global image level, but locally at the
pixel level. Specifically, we introduce an approach to lo-
calizing the regions whose predictions were affected by the
attack, i.e., not the image regions that were perturbed. In an
autonomous driving scenario, this would allow one to focus
more directly on the potential dangers themselves, rather
than on the image regions that caused them.
To summarize, our contributions are as follows. We
introduce the idea of indirect local adversarial attacks for
semantic segmentation networks. We design an adaptive,
image-dependent local attack strategy. We show the exis-
tence of a universal, non image-independent adversarial
patch for a given network and dataset. We study the impact
of context on a network’s sensitivity to our indirect local at-
tacks. We introduce a method to detect indirect local attacks
at both image level and pixel level. Our attack and detec-
tion code will be made publicly available upon acceptance
of this paper.
2. Related Work
Context in Semantic Segmentation Networks. While
context has been shown to improve the results of tradi-
tional semantic segmentation methods [15, 19, 20, 11], the
early deep fully-convolutonal semantic segmentation net-
works [26, 13] only gave each pixel a limited receptive
field, thus encoding relatively local relationships. Since
then, several solutions have been proposed to account for
wider context. For example, UNet [38] uses contracting
path to capture larger context followed by a expanding path
to upsample the intermediate low-resolution representation
back to the input resolution. ParseNet [24] relies on global
pooling of the final convolutional features to aggregate con-
text information. This idea was extended to using different
pooling strides in PSPNet [46], so as to encode different lev-
els of context. In [43], dilated convolutions were introduced
to increase the size fo the receptive field. PSANet [47] is
designed so that each local feature vector is connected to
all the other ones in the feature map, thus learning contex-
tual information adaptively. EncNet [45] captures context
via a separate network branch that predicts the presence of
the object categories in the scene without localizing them.
DANet [10] uses a dual attention mechanism to attend to
the most important spatial and channel locations in the fi-
nal feature map. In particular, the DANet position attention
module selectively aggregates the features at all positions
using a weighted sum. In practice, all of these strategies to
use larger contextual information have been shown to out-
perform simple FCNs on clean samples. Here, however,
we show that this makes the resulting networks more vul-
nerable to indirect local adversarial attacks, even when the
perturbed region covers less than 1% of the input image.
Adversarial Attacks on Semantic Segmentation: Ad-
versarial attacks aim to perturb an input image with an
imperceptible noise so as to make a DNN produce erro-
neous predictions. So far, the main focus of the adver-
sarial attack literature has been image classification, for
which diverse attack and defense strategies have been pro-
posed [12, 4, 31, 21, 7, 30, 34]. In this context, it was shown
that deep networks can be attacked even when one does not
have access to the model weights [25, 33], that attacks can
be transferred across different networks [39], and that uni-
versal perturbations that can be applied to any input image
exist [28, 29, 36].
Motivated by the observations made in the context of
image classification, adversarial attacks were extended to
semantic segmentation. In [2], the effectiveness of attack
strategies designed for classification was studied for dif-
ferent segmentation networks. In [42], a dense adversary
generation attack was proposed, consisting of projecting the
gradient in each iteration with minimal distortion. In [16],
a universal perturbation was learnt using the whole image
dataset. None of these works, however, impose any con-
straints on the location of the attack in the input image. As
such, the entire image is perturbed, which, while effective
when the attacker has access to the image itself, would not
allow one to physically modify the scene so as to fool, e.g.,
autonomous vehicles.
This, in essence, was the task addressed in [9], where it
was shown that placing a small, well-engineered patch on
a traffic sign was able to fool a classification network into
making wrong decisions. Such attacks, however, are direct,
in the sense that the perturbation is located on the object that
should be misclassified. Here, by contrast, we study the im-
pact of indirect local attacks, where the perturbation is out-
side the object of interest. This would allow one to modify
static portions of the scene so as to, e.g., make dynamic ob-
jects disappear. We then study the impact of the contextual
information exploited by different network architectures on
robustness, and introduce an attack strategy that adaptively
learns the minimal number of patches needed to misclas-
sify the dynamic objects of interest. Note that patch-based
attacks were used in the contemporary work [37] to attack
optical flow models. Here, we study this for semantic seg-
mentation, and introduce an approach to finding the best
patch locations, instead of using manually-placed patches
as in [37]. Furthermore, in contrast to [37], we study in-
direct attacks that aim to preserve the correct labels within
the attacked patch but fool other image regions, and propose
detection strategies.
When it comes to detecting attacks to semantic segmen-
tation networks, there exist only two techniques [41, 23].
In [41], detection is achieved by checking the consistency
of predictions obtained from overlapping image patches.
In [23], the attacked label map is passed through a pix2pix
generator [17] to re-synthesize an image, which is then
compared with the input image to detect the attack. In con-
trast to these works that need either multiple passes through
the network or an auxiliary detector, we detect the attack
by analyzing the internal subspaces of the segmentation
network. To this end, inspired by the algorithm of [22]
designed for image classification, we compute the Maha-
lanobis distance of the features to pre-trained class condi-
tional distributions. In contrast to [41, 23], which study only
global image-level detection, we show that our approach is
applicable at both the image and the pixel level, yielding the
first study on localizing the regions fooled by the attack.
3. Indirect Local Segmentation Attacks
Let us now introduce our diverse strategies to attack a
semantic segmentation network. In semantic segmentation,
given a clean image X ∈ RW×H×C , where W , H and C
are the width, height, and number of channels, respectively,
a network is trained to minimize a loss function of the form
L(X) =
W×H∑
j=1
J(ytruej , f(X)j) , (1)
where J is typically taken as the cross-entropy between the
true label ytruej and the predicted label f(X)j at spatial lo-
cation j. In this context, an adversarial attack is carried out
by optimizing for a perturbation that forces the network to
output wrong labels for some (or all) of the pixels. Below,
we denote by F ∈ {0,1}W×H the fooling mask such that
Fj = 1 if the j-th pixel location is targeted by the attacker to
be misclassified and Fj = 0 is the predicted label should be
preserved. In the remainder of this section, we present our
different local attack strategies, and finally introduce our at-
tack detection technique.
3.1. Indirect Local Attacks
To study the sensitivity of segmentation networks, we
propose to perform local perturbations, confined to prede-
fined regions such as class-specific regions or patches, and
to fool other regions than those perturbed. For example,
in the context of automated driving, we may aim to perturb
only the regions belonging to road in the input image to fool
the car regions in the output label map. This would allow
one to modify the physical, static scene while targetting dy-
namic objects.
Formally, given a clean image X ∈ RW×H×C , we aim
to find an additive perturbation δ ∈ RW×H×C within a per-
turbation mask M that yields erroneous labels within the
fooling mask F. To achieve this, we define the perturbation
mask M ∈ {0,1}W×H such that Mj = 1 if the j-th pixel
location can be perturbed and Mj = 0 otherwise.
Let ypredi be the label obtained from the clean image at
pixel i. An untargeted attack can then be expressed as the
solution to the optimization problem
δ∗ = argmin
δ
∑
j|Fj=1
−J(ypredj , f(X + M δ)j)
+
∑
j|Fj=0
J(ypredj , f(X + M δ)j) ,
(2)
which aims to minimize the probability of ypredj in the tar-
geted regions while maximizing it in the rest of the image.
By contrast, for a targeted attack whose goal is to mis-
classify any pixel j in the fooling region to pre-defined label
ytj , we write the optimization problem
δ∗ = argmin
δ
∑
j|Fj=1
J(ytj , f(X + M δ)j)
+
∑
i|Fj=0
J(ypredj , f(X + M δ)j) .
(3)
We solve (2) and (3) using the efficient iterative projected
gradient descent algorithm [3] with an `p-norm perturbation
budget ‖M δ‖p < , where p ∈ {2,∞}.
Note that the formulations above allow one to achieve
any local attack. To perform indirect local attacks, we can
simply define the masks M and F in such a way that they
do not intersect, i.e., MF = 0, where  is element wise
product operator.
3.2. Adaptive Attacks
The attacks described in Section 3.1 assume the avail-
ability of a fixed, predefined perturbation mask M. In prac-
tice, however, one might want to find the best location for
an attack, as well as make the attack as local as possible. In
this section, we introduce an approach to achieving this by
enforcing structured sparsity on the perturbation mask.
To this end, we first re-write the previous attack scheme
under an `2 budget as an optimization problem. Let
Jt(X,M,F, δ, f,ypred,yt) denote the objective function of
either (2) or (3), where yt can be ignored in the untargeted
case. Following [4], we write an adversarial attack under an
`2 budget as the solution to the optimization problem
δ∗ = argmin
δ
λ1‖δ‖22 + Jt(X,M,F, δ, f,ypred,yt) , (4)
where λ1 balances the influence of the term aiming to min-
imize the magnitude of the perturbation.
To identify the best location for an attack together with
confining the perturbations to as small an area as possi-
ble, we divide the initial perturbation mask M into T non-
overlapping patches. This can be achieved by defining T
masks {Mt ∈ RW×H} such that, for any s, t, with s 6= t,
Ms Mt = 0, and
∑T
t=1 Mt = M. Our goal then be-
comes that of finding a perturbation that is non-zero in the
smallest number of such masks. This can be achieved by
modifying (4) as
δ∗ = argmin
δ
λ2
T∑
t=1
‖Mt  δ‖2 + λ1‖δ‖22
+Jt(X,M,F, δ, f,ypred,yt) ,
(5)
whose first term encodes an l2,1 group sparsity regularizer
encouraging complete groups to go to zero. Such a regu-
larizer has been commonly used in the sparse coding lit-
erature [44, 32], and more recently in the context of deep
networks for compression purposes [40, 1]. In our con-
text, this regularizer encourages as many as possible of the
{Mt  δ} to go to zero, and thus confines the perturbation
to a small number of regions that most effectively fool the
targeted area F. λ2 balances the influence of this term with
the other ones. We then quantify the sparsity of the resulting
attack as the percentage of pixels that are perturbed.
3.3. Universal Local Attacks
The strategies discussed in Sections 3.1 and 3.2 are
image-specific. To find a universal perturbation effective
across all images, we write the optimization problem
δ∗ = argmin
δ
1
N
N∑
i=1
Ju(X
i,M,Fi, δ, f,ypredi ) (6)
where Ju(·) is the objective function for a single image,
N is the number of training images, Xi is the i-th image
with fooling mask Fi, and the mask M is the global per-
turbation mask used for all images. In principle, M can be
obtained by sampling patches over all possible image loca-
tions. However, we observed such a strategy to be unstable
during learning. Hence, in our experiments, we confine our-
selves to one or a few fixed patch positions. Note that, to
give the attacker more flexibility, we take the universal at-
tack defined in (6) to be an untargeted attack given in (2).
3.4. Adversarial Attack Detection
To understand the strength of the attacks discussed
above, we introduce a detection method that can act either at
the global image level or at the pixel level. The latter is par-
ticularly interesting in the case of indirect attacks, where the
perturbation regions and the fooled regions are different. In
this case, our goal is to localize the pixels that were fooled,
which is more challenging that finding those that were per-
turbed, since their intensity values were not altered. To this
end, we use a score based on the Mahalanobis distance de-
fined on the intermediate feature representations. This is be-
cause, as discussed in [22, 27] in the context of image clas-
sification, the attacked samples can be better characterized
in the representation space than in the output label space.
Specifically, we use a set of training images to compute
class-conditional Gaussian distributions, with class-specific
means µ`c and covariance Σ
` shared across all C classes,
from the features extracted at every intermediate layer ` of
the network within locations corresponding to class label c.
We then define a confidence score for each spatial location
j in layer ` as
C(X`j) = max
c∈[1,C]
− (X`j − µ`c)>Σ`−1 (X`j − µ`c) , (7)
where X`j denotes the feature vector at location j in layer `.
We handle the different spatial feature map sizes in dif-
ferent layers by resizing all of them to a fixed shape. We
then concatenate the confidence scores in all layers at every
spatial location and use the resultingL-dimensional vectors,
with L being the number of layers, as input to a logistic re-
gression classifier with weights {α`}. We then train this
classifier to predict whether a pixel was fooled or not. At
test time, we compute the prediction for an image location
j as
∑
` α`C(X
`
j).
To perform detection at the global image level, we sum
over the confidence scores of all spatial positions. That is,
for layer `, we compute an image-level score as C(X`) =∑
j C(X
`
j). We then train another logistic regression clas-
sifier using these global confidence scores as input.
4. Experiments
In this section, we first explain our experimental setup
and implementation details, and then analyze the vulnera-
bility of state-of-the-art semantic segmentation networks to
different types of attacks. Finally, we evaluate our image-
level and pixel-level detection strategies.
Datasets. In our experiments, we use the Cityscapes [5]
and Pascal VOC [8] datasets, the two most popular semantic
segmentation benchmarks. Specifically, for Cityscapes, we
use the complete validation set, consisting of 500 images,
for untargeted attacks, but use a subset of 150 images con-
taining dynamic object instances of vehicle classes whose
combined area covers at least 8% of the image for targeted
attacks. This is to focus on fooling sufficiently large re-
gions, because reporting results on too small dynamic ob-
jects may not be representative of the true behavior of our
algorithms. For Pascal VOC, we use 250 randomly selected
images from the validation set because of the limited re-
sources we have access to relative to the large number of
experiments we performed.
Models. We use publicly-available state-of-the-art models,
namely FCN [26], DRNet [43] , PSPNet [46], PSANet [47],
DANet [10] on Cityscapes, and FCN [26] and PSANet [47]
on PASCAL VOC. FCN, PSANet, PSPNet and DANet
share the same ResNet [14] backbone network. We per-
form all experiments at the image resolution of 512× 1024
for Cityscapes and 512×512 for PASCAL VOC. Since dif-
ferent models can have different normalization strategies for
the input image, we include normalization in the network
and pass the network an input image scaled to [0,1]. More
details on the datasets and the models can be found in the
supplementary material.
Adversarial attacks. We use the iterative projected gradi-
ent descent (PGD) method with `∞ and `2 norm budgets,
as described in Section 3. Following [2], we set the num-
ber of iterations for PGD to a maximum of 100, with an
early termination criterion of 90% of attack success rate on
the targeted objects. Given the dual objective of the loss
functions in (2) and (3), it may happen that the gradients
to maximize the confidence of labels at non-targeted lo-
cations dominate those at targeted ones. Hence, as sug-
gested in [16], we ignore the loss at locations where the
label is predicted correctly as the target label with a confi-
dence of at least 0.3. We evaluate `∞ attacks with a step
size α ∈ {1e-5, 1e-4, 1e-3, 5e-3}. For `2 attacks, we set
α ∈ {8e-3, 4e-2, 8e-2}. We perform two types of attacks;
targeted and untargeted. The untargeted attacks focus on
fooling the network to move away from the predicted la-
bel. For the targeted attacks, we chose a safety-sensitive
goal, and thus aim to fool the dynamic object regions to be
misclassified as their (spatially) nearest background label.
We do not use ground-truth information in any of the ex-
periments but perform attacks based on the predicted labels
only. We implement our algorithms in PyTorch [35] using
the advertorch library [6] on a single Tesla 32GB GPU.
Evaluation metric. Following [16, 2, 42], we report the
mean Intersection over Union (mIoU) and Attack Success
Rate (ASR) computed over the entire dataset. The mIoU
of FCN [26], DRNet [43], PSPNet [46], PSANet [47], and
DANet [10] on clean samples at full resolution are 0.66,
0.64, 0.73, 0.72, 0.67, respectively. For targeted attacks,
we report the average ASRt, computed as the percentage
of pixels that were predicted as the target label. We addi-
tionally report the mIoUu, which is computed between the
adversarial and normal sample predictions. For untargeted
Network Attack α = 0.00001 α = 0.0001 α = 0.001 α = 0.005
FCN [26]
`∞
0.64 / 5.0% 0.28 / 29% 0.13 / 55% 0.11 / 61%
PSPNet [46] 0.70 / 12% 0.05 / 85% 0.00 / 89% 0.00 / 90%
PSANet [47] 0.59 / 14% 0.03 / 85% 0.01 / 90% 0.00 / 90%
DANet [10] 0.80 / 5.0% 0.11 / 79% 0.01 / 90% 0.00 / 90%
DRN [43] 0.64 / 6.0% 0.15 / 56% 0.03 / 84% 0.02 / 86%
(a) `∞ attack
Network Attack α = 0.008 α = 0.04 α = 0.08
FCN [26]
`2
0.60 / 10% 0.56 / 26% 0.27 / 36%
PSPNet [46] 0.67 / 19% 0.23 / 67% 0.06 / 84%
PSANet [47] 0.59 / 14% 0.21 / 63% 0.06 / 82%
DANet [10] 0.79 / 11% 0.43 / 49% 0.13 / 79%
DRN [43] 0.63 / 10% 0.24 / 47% 0.13 / 64%
(b) `2 attack
Table 1: Indirect Attacks on Cityscapes to fool dynamic classes
while perturbing static ones. The numbers indicate mIoUu/ASRt,
obtained using different step sizes α for `∞ and `2 attacks.
attacks, we report the ASRu, computed as the percentage
of pixels that were assigned to a different class than their
normal label prediction. Since, in most of our experiments,
the fooling region is confined to local objects, we compute
the above metrics only at the fooling mask regions. We ob-
served that the non-targeted regions retain their prediction
label more than 98% of the time, and hence we report the
metrics at non-targeted regions in the supplementary ma-
terial. To evaluate the detection of adversarial attacks, we
report the Area under the Receiver Operating Characteris-
tics (AUROC), both at image level, as in [41, 23], and at
pixel level.
4.1. Indirect Attacks
Let us study the sensitivity of the networks to indirect lo-
cal attacks. In this setting, we first perform a targeted attack,
formalized in (3), to fool the dynamic object areas by allow-
ing the attacker to perturb any region belonging to the static
object classes. This is achieved by setting the perturbation
mask M to 1 at all the static class pixels and the fooling
mask F to 1 at all the dynamic class pixels. We report the
mIoUu and ASRt metrics in Table 1a and 1b on Cityscapes
for `∞ and `2 attacks, respectively. As evidenced from the
tables, FCN is more robust to such indirect attacks than the
networks that leverage contextual information. In particu-
lar, PSANet and PSPNet are highly sensitive to these at-
tacks.
To further understand the impact of indirect local at-
tacks, we constrain the perturbation region to a subset of
the static class regions. To do this in a systematic manner,
we perturb the static class regions that are at least d pixels
away from any dynamic object, and vary the value d. The
results of this experiment using `2 and `∞ attacks are pro-
vided in Table 2. Here, we chose a step size α = 0.005 for
`∞ and α = 0.08 for `2. Similar conclusions as in the previ-
Network Attack d = 0 d = 50 d = 100 d = 150
FCN [26]
`∞
0.11 / 64% 0.77 / 2.0% 0.98 / 0% 1.00 / 0.0%
PSPNet [46] 0.00 / 90% 0.14 / 73% 0.24 / 60% 0.55 / 23%
PSANet [47] 0.00 / 90% 0.11 / 71% 0.13 / 65% 0.29 / 47%
DANet [10] 0.00 / 90% 0.13 / 81% 0.48 / 43% 0.80 / 10%
DRN [43] 0.02 / 86% 0.38 / 22% 0.73 / 3% 0.94 / 1.0%
FCN [26]
`2
0.27 / 36% 0.79 / 2.0% 0.98 / 2.0% 0.99 / 1.0%
PSPNet [46] 0.06 / 84% 0.18 / 73% 0.55 / 23% 0.99 / 0.0%
PSANet [47] 0.06 / 82% 0.10 / 75% 0.14 / 66 % 0.31 / 44%
DANet [10] 0.13 / 79% 0.27 / 71% 0.67 / 26% 0.85 / 7.0%
DRN [43] 0.13 / 64% 0.44 / 17% 0.76 / 3.0% 0.95 / 0.0%
Table 2: Impact of Local Attacks by perturbing pixels that
are at least d pixels away from any dynamic class. We report
mIoUu/ASRt for different values of d.
(a) Adversarial image (b Perturbation
(d) PSPNet
(c) FCN
(d) PSANet (d) DANet
Figure 2: Indirect Local attack on different networks with
perturbations at least d = 100 pixels away from any dy-
namic class.
ous non-local scenario can be drawn: Modern networks that
use larger receptive fields are extremely vulnerable to such
perturbations, even when they are far away from the tar-
geted regions. By contrast, FCN is again more robust. For
example, as shown in Figure 2, while an adversarial attack
occurring 100 pixels away from the nearest dynamic objects
has a high success rate on the context-aware networks, the
FCN predictions remain accurate.
4.2. Adaptive Indirect Local Attacks
We now study the impact of our approach to adaptively
finding the most sensitive context region to fool the dynamic
objects. To this end, we use the group sparsity based opti-
mization given in (5) and find the minimal perturbation re-
gion to fool all dynamic objects to their nearest static label.
Specifically, we achieve this in two steps. First, we divide
the perturbation mask M corresponding to all static class
pixels into uniform patches of size h×w, and find the most
sensitive ones by solving (5) with a relatively large group
sparsity weight λ2 = 100.0. Second, we limit the perturba-
tion region by selecting the n patches that have the largest
values ‖Mt  δ‖2), choosing n so as to achieve a given
sparsity level S ∈ {75%, 85%, 90%, 95%}. Specifically, S
is computed as the percentage of perturbed pixels relative to
the initial perturbation mask. We then re-optimize (5) with
λ2 = 0.0. In both steps, we set λ1 = 0.01 and use the Adam
optimizer [18] with a learning rate of 0.01 and a patch size
h = 60, w = 120. We clip the perturbation values below
Network S = 75% S = 85% S = 90% S = 95%
FCN [26] 0.52 / 12% 0.66 / 6% 0.73 / 4% 0.84 / 1.0%
PSPNett [46] 0.19 / 70% 0.31 / 54% 0.41 / 42% 0.53 / 21%
PSANet [47] 0.10 / 78% 0.16 / 71% 0.20 / 64% 0.35 / 44%
DANet [10] 0.30 / 64% 0.52 / 43% 0.64 / 30% 0.71 / 21%
DRN [43] 0.42 / 23% 0.55 / 13% 0.63 / 9.0% 0.77 / 4.5%
Table 3: Adaptive Indirect Local Attacks on Cityscapes. We
report the mIoUu/ASRt for different sparsity levels S.
Network S = 75% S = 85% S = 90% S = 95%
FCN [26] 0.52 / 12% 0.66 / 6.0% 0.73 / 4.0% 0.84 / 1.0%
PSANet [47] 0.10 / 78% 0.16 / 71% 0.20 / 64% 0.35 / 44%
Table 4: Adaptive Indirect Local Attacks on PASCAL VOC.
We report the mIoUu/ASRt for different sparsity levels S.
Network 51× 102(1.0%) 76× 157(2.3%) 102× 204(4.0%) 153× 306(9.0%)
FCN [26] 0.85 / 2.0% 0.78 / 4.0% 0.73 / 9.0% 0.58 / 18%
PSPNet [46] 0.79 / 3.0% 0.63 / 11% 0.44 / 27% 0.08 / 83%
PSANet [47] 0.41 / 37% 0.22 / 60% 0.14 / 70% 0.10 / 90%
DANet [10] 0.79 / 4.0% 0.71 / 10% 0.65 / 15% 0.40 / 42%
DRN [43] 0.82 / 3.0% 0.78 / 8.0% 0.71 / 14% 0.55 / 28%
Table 5: Universal Local Attacks. We show the impact of patch
size h×w (area%) on different networks and report mIoUu/ASRu.
0.005 to 0.0 at each iteration. This results in very local per-
turbation regions, active only in the most sensitive areas, as
shown in Figure 3 for PSANet on Cityscapes. As shown
in Table 3, all context-aware networks are significantly af-
fected by such perturbations, even when they are confined to
small background regions. This means that, in the physical
world, an attacker could add a small sticker at a static posi-
tion to essentially make dynamic objects disappear from the
network’s view.
For PASCAL VOC, we use the same hyperparameter
values except for λ2, which is set to 10.0 in the first opti-
mization step. Furthermore, we set the patch size to h = 60,
w = 60. As shown in Figure 4, we are able to find the most
sensitive regions that cover a minimum area in the static
class to fool the dynamic foreground objects. We report
the effect of our adaptive indirect attacks on PSANet and
FCN in Table 4. For instance, at high sparsity level of 95%,
PSANet has ASRt of 44% compared to 1% for FCN.
4.3. Universal Local Attacks
In this section, instead of considering image-dependent
perturbations, we study the existence of universal local per-
turbations and their impact on semantic segmentation net-
works. In this setting, we perform untargeted local attacks
by placing a fixed-size patch at a predetermined position.
While the patch location can in principle be sampled at any
location, we found learning its position to be unstable to due
to the large number of possible patch locations in the entire
dataset. Hence, here, we consider the scenario where the
(a) Adversarial image (b) Perturbation (c) Normal Seg. (d) Adversarial Seg.
Figure 3: Adaptive Indirect Local Attacks on Cityscapes with PSANet [47]. An adversarial input image (a) when attacked
at positions shown as red boxes with a perturbation (b) is mis-classified at dynamic object areas in the normal segmentation
map (c) to result in (d).
(a) Adversarial image (b Perturbation (c) Normal seg. (d) Adversarial seg. (h) Adversarial seg.(g) Normal seg.(f) Perturbation(e) Adversarial image
Figure 4: Adaptive Indirect Local Attacks on PASCAL VOC with PSANet [47]. An adversarial input image (a),(e) when
attacked at positions shown as red boxes with a perturbation (b),(f) is mis-classified at foreground object areas in the normal
segmentation map in (c), (g) to result in (d), (h), respectively.
(a) Adversarial image (b) FCN [26] (c) PSPNet [46] (d) PSANet [47] (e) DANet [10]
Figure 5: Universal Local Attacks on segmentation networks. The degradation in FCN [26] is limited to the attacked area,
whereas for context-aware networks, such as PSPNet [46], PSANet [47], DANet [10], it extends to far away regions.
patch is located at the center of the image. We then learn a
local perturbation that can fool the entire dataset of images
for a given network by optimizing the objective given in (6).
Specifically, the perturbation mask M is active only at the
patch location and the fooling mask F at all image positions,
i.e., at both static and dynamic classes. We learn the univer-
sal local perturbation using 100 images from Cityscapes and
use the remaining 400 images for evaluation purpose. We
use `∞ optimization with α = 0.001 for 200 epochs on the
training set. We report the results of such universal patch
attacks in Table 5 for different patch sizes. As shown in
the table, PSANet and PSPNet are vulnerable to such uni-
versal attacks, even when only 2.3% of the image area is
perturbed. From Figure 5, we can see that the fooling re-
gion propagates to a large area far away from the perturbed
one.
4.4. Attack Detection
Networks Perturbation Fooling `∞ / `2 Mis. Global AUROC Local AUROCregion region norm pixels % SC [41] / Re-Syn [23] / Ours Ours
FCN [26]
Global Full 0.10 / 17.60 90% 1.00 / 1.00 / 0.94 0.90
UP Full 0.30 / 37.60 4% 0.71 / 0.63 / 1.00 0.94
FS Dyn 0.07 / 2.58 13% 0.57 / 0.71 / 1.00 0.87
AP Dyn 0.14 / 3.11 1.7% 0.51 / 0.65 / 0.87 0.89
PSPNet [46]
Global Full 0.06 / 10.74 83% 0.90 / 1.00 / 0.99 0.85
UP Full 0.30 / 38.43 11% 0.66 / 0.70 / 1.00 0.96
FS Dyn 0.03 / 1.78 14% 0.57 / 0.75 / 0.90 0.87
AP Dyn 0.11 / 5.25 11% 0.57 / 0.75 / 0.90 0.82
PSANet [47]
Global Full 0.05 / 8.26 92% 0.90 / 1.00 / 1.00 0.67
UP Full 0.30 / 38.6 60% 0.65 / 1.00 / 1.00 0.98
FS Dyn 0.02 / 1.14 12% 0.61 / 0.76 / 1.00 0.92
AP Dyn 0.10 / 5.10 10% 0.50 / 0.82 / 1.00 0.94
DANet [10]
Global Full 0.06 / 12.55 82% 0.89 / 1.00 / 1.00 0.68
UP Full 0.30 / 37.20 10% 0.67 / 0.63 / 0.92 0.89
FS Dyn 0.05 / 1.94 13% 0.57 / 0.69 / 0.94 0.88
AP Dyn 0.14 / 6.12 43% 0.59 / 0.68 / 0.98 0.82
Table 6: Attack detection on Cityscapes with different perturba-
tion settings.
We now turn to studying the effectiveness of the attack
detection strategies described in Section 3.4. We also com-
pare our approach to the only two detection techniques that
have been proposed for semantic segmentation [41, 23].
The method in [41] uses the spatial consistency of the
predictions obtained from K = 50 random overlapping
patches of size 256 × 256. The one in [23] compares an
image re-synthesized from the predicted labels with the in-
put image. Both methods were designed to handle attacks
that fools the entire label map, unlike our work where we
aim to fool local regions. Furthermore, both methods per-
form detection at the image level, and thus, in contrast to
ours, do not localize the fooled regions at the pixel level.
We study detection in four perturbation settings: Global
image perturbations (Global) to fool the entire image; Uni-
versal patch perturbations (UP) at a fixed location to fool the
entire image; Full static (FS) class perturbations to fool the
dynamic classes; Adaptive patch (AP) perturbations in the
static class regions to fool the dynamic objects. As shown
in Table 6, while the state-of-the-art methods [41, 23] has
high Global AUROC in the first setting where the entire im-
age is targeted, our detection strategy outperforms them by
a large margin in the other scenarios. We believe this to
be due to the fact that, with local attacks, the statistics ob-
tained by studying the consistency across local patches, as
in [41], are much closer to the clean image statistics. Sim-
ilarly, the image re-synthesized by a pix2pix generator, as
used in [23], will look much more similar to the input one in
the presence of local attacks instead of global ones. For all
the perturbation settings, we also report the mean percent-
age of pixels misclassified relative to the number of pixels
in the image. We provide additional detection results with
different perturbation settings and noise levels in the sup-
plementary material.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we have studied the impact of indirect
local image perturbations on the performance of modern
semantic segmentation networks. We have observed that
the state-of-the-art segmentation networks, such as PSANet
and PSPNet, are more vulnerable to local perturbations
because their use of context, which improves their accuracy
on clean images, enables the perturbations to be propagated
to distant image regions. As such, they can be attacked
by perturbations that cover as little as 2.3% of the image
area. We have then proposed a Mahalanobis distance-based
detection strategy which has proven effective at image-
level attack detection. While promising, its performance at
localizing the fooled regions in a pixel-wise manner still
leaves room for improvement, and addressing this will be
our goal in the future.
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6. Implementation Details
In this section, we provide detailed explanations about
the experiments described in Section 4 of the main paper.
6.1. Models
All models for the experiments were implemented in
PyTorch [35]. For generating adversarial attack, we use
the advertorch [6] library. Since different networks may
have different normalization values for mean and standard
deviation, we model normalization as a first layer inside the
network and pass an RGB image scaled to the range [0,1].
FCN. We use the publicly released model1 from the authors
of [47], which is trained together with PSANet [47] with an
additional auxiliary loss. We use the ResNet-50 version for
our evaluations.
PSPNet. We use trained model1 released by the authors
of [47]. It contains the same ResNet-50 as backbone
network. The pyramid pooling module is a 4-level pyramid,
which is concatenated to the final convolutional spatial map
and later fed to a classification layer.
PSANet.We experiment with the trained model1 provided
by authors of [47] with ResNet-50 as backbone network.
The PSA layer contains two sub-branches, namely collect
and distribute, that favor a bi-directional information flow
from each position to all other positions in the spatial
feature map.
DANet. We use the trained model2 from the authors of
DANet [10]. DANet uses ResNet-101 as backbone network
followed by a spatial and channel wise attention module.
We use DANet with a hierarchy of grids of different sizes
(4,8,16) in the last layer of each ResNet block.
DRN. We use the trained model3 released by authors
of [43]. We choose ResNet-22 as backbone network with
dilated version corresponding to type D.
U-Net. Along with the above-mentioned models, we evalu-
ate the robustness of the U-Net architecture to local attacks.
Due to the non-availability of a trained PyTorch [35]
version of the U-Net model, we re-trained it ourselves,
achieving 33.7% mIoU on Cityscapes.
Along with above six discussed models on Cityscapes,
we experiment on PASCAL VOC [8] with trained models of
FCN [26]1 and PSANet [47]1 provided by authors of [47].
1https://github.com/hszhao/semseg
2https://github.com/junfu1115/DANet
3https://github.com/fyu/drn
Dynamic class Number of Images
Person 115
Rider 66
Car 150
Truck 33
Bus 23
Train 7
Motorcycle 24
Bicycle 88
Table 7: Cityscapes sampled dataset statistics of the 150
images whose combined instance area of vehicle categories
is more than 8%.
6.2. Datasets
Cityscapes: We use the validation set of the Cityscapes [5]
dataset consisting of 500 images from 19 classes. We di-
vide the pixels at every position in the image into one of
two sets, based on the category attribute provided by the
authors. The first set consists of pixels belonging to static
classes with category attribute road, sidewalk, building,
wall, fence, pole, traffic light, traffic sign, vegetation, ter-
rain, sky. The second set corresponds to regions of dynamic
classes person, rider, car, truck, bus, train, motorcycle, bi-
cycle.
The Cityscapes dataset has on average of 8% of the pix-
els corresponding to dynamic classes in each image. Since
our study was targeted to mis-classify the dynamic ob-
jects, images with dynamic instances that occupy small re-
gions might not be meaningful since such regions lie in
the immediate receptive field of their surroundings. There-
fore, we take a subset of images consisting of 150 images
whose combined region of instances corresponding to ve-
hicle classes ( car, truck, bus, train, motorcycle, bicycle) is
greater than 8%. We provide the statistics of the resulting
dataset in Table 7.
While the original Cityscapes dataset was captured
at 2048 × 1024 resolution, we resize the image to half
resolution of 1024 × 512 as the original size is too large
to fit into GPU memory. Furthermore, we crop the bottom
region of the image corresponding to the ego-vehicle of
height 62 pixels and resize the image back to 1024 × 512
pixels. For fair comparison, all models use the same 1024
× 512 resolution as input to the network without any tiling.
PASCAL VOC: We use a subset of 250 images from the
original validation set consisting of 1449 images. It con-
tains 20 foreground classes and one background class. In
all settings, we target the pixels corresponding to all 20
foreground classes by perturbing a subset of the background
area.
6.3. Attack Algorithms
We solve the indirect attacks given in Sections 3.1 and
3.2 of the main paper using the efficient iterative projected
gradient descent algorithm [3] with an `p-norm perturbation
budget ‖M δ‖p < , where p ∈ {2,∞}, using a step size
α. In all our experiments, we set the maximum `p-norm
of perturbation  as the product of the number of iterations
given by 100 times α for `∞ attacks. For `2 attacks, we set
the maximum `2 norm of perturbation  to 100.
Formally, given an input image X, the ad-
versarial attack minimizes the objective function,
Jt(X,M,F, δ, f,ypred,yt) to find the optimal δ. We
solve for δ in an iterative manner as
δ(0) = 0 (8)
δ(n+1) = Clippε
{
δ(n) − α∇XJt(X,M,F, δ, f,ypred,yt)
}
,
(9)
where Clippε clips the perturbation within the `p ball of ra-
dius . For `∞-norm based attacks, the gradient update is
given by
∇XJ = sgn(∇X(Jt(X,M,F, δ, f,ypred,yt))), (10)
where sgn is the signum function.
For `2-norm based attacks, the gradient update is given
by
r = ∇X(Jt(X,M,F, δ, f,ypred,yt)) (11)
∇XJ = r‖r‖2 . (12)
We observe that the DAG attack [42] is similar to the
PGD-`2 attack. While DAG projects the gradient by r‖r‖∞ ,
PGD-`2 projects the gradient by r‖r‖2 . We emphasize that
our formalism for local indirect attacks is general and could
be applied to other adversary generation techniques [42, 4].
6.4. Attack Detection Algorithms
State-of-the-art methods. In this paper, we compare the
spatial consistency [41] method and image re-synthesis
method [23] for adversarial attack detection at image level.
In [41], given an input image of 1024 × 512 pixels, we
crop 50 sufficiently overlapping pairs of patches of size
256×256 and compute the average mIoU of the overlapped
patch regions as the confidence score for attack detection.
In [23], we use the pix2pix generator to re-synthesize the
image from the label map and then compute the `2 distance
of the input image and the re synthesized one in HOG
feature space.
Our method. We provide the implementation details of
our attack detection based on the Mahalanobis distance. To
this end, we compute the class-conditional mean µ`c at ev-
ery layer ` of the network within locations corresponding
to class label c of the ground truth. Furthermore, we com-
pute the group variance Σ` for every layer ` of the network
using features extracted at layer `. Since the number of fea-
tures extracted on the training set can be high, we propose to
compute the mean and variance on averaged features within
locations corresponding to each label.
Formally, let X`j be the feature extracted at layer ` at
position j for image X. Let the size of the feature map
X` be given as W` × H` × K` where W`, H`, K` are the
width, height and number of channels for layer `. Let Lc ∈
RW`×H` be the label mask activated at positions where the
label is c, i.e., Lcj = 1 if the j-th pixel location belongs to
label c and Lcj = 0 otherwise.
First, we compute the averaged feature corresponding to
label c given by Xˆ`c =
∑
j|Lj=1 X
`
j . We then learn µ
`
c and
Σ` using {Xˆ`c|X ∈ [X0, ...,XN ]} extracted from all N
images in the training set. In the end, we obtain µ`c ∈ RK`
and Σ` ∈ RK`×K` for a layer ` in the network which is used
as confidence score of Eq.(7) of main paper.
We extract features at the end of every block in the
ResNet backbone followed by a context layer and a clas-
sification layer. By doing so, we obtain a feature vector for
the logistic detector of size L = 6 for FCN; L = 7 for
PSANet; L = 7 for PSPNet; L = 5 for DANet; L = 5 for
DRN. For evaluation purpose, we use 80% of the data for
training and the remaining 20% for testing.
6.5. Performance Metrics
For evaluation, we use the following metrics to measure
the effectiveness of our indirect local attack.
Intersection over Union. We report the mIoU used in the
domain of segmentation to evaluate the effectiveness of the
attack. We report the mIoU at positions that we aim to
fool (f ) since at the rest of positions, the label is retained
almost 98% of times. For untargeted attacks, we report
mIoUfu as the mIoU calculated between the normal image
prediction and its counterpart adversarial image prediction
at fooling positions. In the case of targeted attacks, along
with mIoUfu, we report mIoU
f
t as the mIoU calculated
between the normal image prediction and targeted label
map at fooling positions.
Attack Success Rate. We report the attack success rate at
the percentage of pixels mis-classified/preserved relative
to the total number of pixels in the fooling/preserved
positions, respectively. We report the mASR separately
at two positions: 1) at positions that we aim to fool (f );
2) at the remaining positions where the label should be
preserved (p). We report mASRfu and mASR
p
u as the
success rate calculated between the normal prediction
and its adversarial image prediction at the fooling and
preserved positions, respectively, for untargeted attacks.
Specifically to calculate mASRfu, we assume the attack
as being successful at a pixel if it mis-classifies it to any
label other than the normal predicted label. In the case
of targeted attacks, we additionally report mASRft as the
success rate calculated between the normal prediction and
targeted label map at fooling positions.
Perceptibility. We take the `∞-norm and `2-norm of the
perturbation image as the two perceptibility scores.
We average the above metrics over the entire test set.
Since in almost all experiments the labels are retained
almost > 98% times at preserved positions, we omitted
reporting mASRpu in the main paper. We reported only
mASRft and mIoU
f
u at the fooling positions in the main
paper as these metrics values are the most diverse in various
attack settings.
AUROC. The area under the receiver operating characteris-
tic curve (AUROC) is computed by plotting the true positive
rate (TPR) against the false positive rate (FPR) by varying
a threshold. We compute the AUROC both at image level
and pixel level and report them in all perturbation settings.
6.6. Cityscapes Experiments
Table 8 and 9 shows the performance of different net-
works by varying noise levels for `∞ and `2 attacks. Ta-
ble 10 and 11 shows the impact of indirect attacks by per-
turbing static ones that are at-least distance d pixels from
dynamic object class with `∞ and `2 attacks. Further, ta-
ble 12 shows the complete performance statistics of differ-
ent networks by tuning the sparsity levels in adaptive at-
tack strategy. We then show the impact of universal single
fixed size patch attacks in Table 13 by varying the patch size
which is placed at the center of the image.
Finally, we show the attack detection results with four
perturbation settings: Global image perturbations (Global)
to fool the entire image; Universal patch perturbations (UP)
at a fixed location to fool the entire image; Full static (FS)
class perturbations to fool the dynamic classes; Adaptive
patch (AP) perturbations in the static class regions to fool
the dynamic objects. Table 14, 15, 16 and 17 shows the
attack detection of our method and other two state-of-the-
art detection methods discussed in main paper with FCN,
PSP, PSANet, DANet respectively.
6.6.1 Qualitative Results on Cityscapes
Figure 6 visualizes adversarial images obtained by varying
the step size α in both `∞ and `2 for indirect local attacks
with PSANet [47]. Figure 7 shows the outputs of indirect
local attacks by perturbing static class pixels that are at
least a distance d from a dynamic class pixel. Figure 8
shows the outputs of universal patch attacks on different
networks by varying the patch area in {1%, 2.3%, 4%, 9%}
of the image area. Figure 9 shows the results of adaptive
local attacks on different networks by varying the sparsity
level of the perturbation.
To understand the effectiveness of the Mahalanobis dis-
tance for attack detection, we visualize the internal sub-
spaces of normal and adversarial samples. Figure 10 and
11 show the visualizations of the nearest cluster assignment
for each spatial location in the top-4 layers for PSPNet [46]
and PSANet [47], respectively. Figure 12 the output of
pixel-level adversarial attack detection using mahalanobis
distance on PSANet [47] with adaptive indirect local attack
at sparsity level 75%.
6.7. PASCAL VOC Experiments
Table 18 shows the robustness of FCN [26] local indirect
attacks than PSANet [47]. For example, at Sparsity level of
95%, FCN [26] has success rate of 13% as compared to 68%
for PSANet.
6.7.1 Qualitative Results on PASCAL VOC
Figure 13 shows the results of adaptive local attacks on
PSANet [47] at Sparsity 95%.
Networks α mIoU mASR Norm of δ
mIoUfu mIoU
f
t mASR
p
u mASR
f
u mASR
f
t `∞-norm `2-norm
FCN [26]
1e-5 0.65 0.08 100% 6% 5% 0.001 0.83
1e-4 0.29 0.27 100% 35% 29% 0.01 4.70
1e-3 0.14 0.49 100% 63% 56% 0.10 15.12
5e-3 0.11 0.55 100% 69% 62% 0.40 50.93
PSPNet [46]
1e-5 0.71 0.10 99% 15% 12% 0.001 0.77
1e-4 0.06 0.53 100% 98% 86% 0.01 3.10
1e-3 0.00 0.62 100% 100% 90% 0.05 8.30
5e-3 0.00 0.63 99% 100% 90% 0.20 37.99
PSANet [47]
1e-5 0.60 0.10 98% 22% 14% 0.001 0.72
1e-4 0.04 0.51 99% 99% 86% 0.01 2.68
1e-3 0.01 0.60 99% 100% 90% 0.05 8.10
5e-3 0.00 0.60 99% 100% 90% 0.18 35.71
DANet [10]
1e-5 0.80 0.06 100% 6% 5% 0.001 0.81
1e-4 0.11 0.50 99% 91% 80% 0.01 3.90
1e-3 0.01 0.65 99% 99% 90% 0.04 8.30
5e-3 0.00 0.66 99% 100% 90% 0.15 31.71
DRNet [43]
1e-5 0.64 0.09 99% 9% 6% 0.001 0.87
1e-4 0.15 0.44 99% 67% 56% 0.01 4.95
1e-3 0.03 0.67 99% 92% 84% 0.08 12.78
5e-3 0.02 0.67 99% 94% 87% 0.27 40.2
U-Net [38]
1e-5 0.35 0.15 99% 29% 20% 0.001 0.91
1e-4 0.02 0.37 99% 95% 76% 0.01 5.74
1e-3 0.00 0.48 99% 99% 87% 0.08 13.34
5e-3 0.00 0.52 99% 100% 89% 0.28 38.89
Table 8: Indirect Attacks on Cityscapes to fool dynamic classes while perturbing entire static ones with `∞ strategy. The success rate
of attacks increases with higher step size α although with higher perceptibility values. FCN is more robust to indirect attacks
while PSANet and PSPNet are relatively more vulnerable to attack even at small step size like α = 1e-4.
Networks α mIoU mASR Norm of δ
mIoUfu mIoU
f
t mASR
p
u mASR
f
u mASR
f
t `∞-norm `2-norm
FCN [26]
8e-3 0.60 0.10 100% 13% 10% 0.02 0.58
4e-2 0.36 0.21 99% 33% 26% 0.05 1.75
8e-2 0.27 0.28 99% 44% 36% 0.08 2.58
PSPNet [46]
8e-3 0.68 0.12 99% 24% 20% 0.01 0.51
4e-2 0.23 0.37 99% 81% 67% 0.02 1.28
8e-2 0.02 0.84 99% 96% 91% 0.03 1.17
PSANet [47]
8e-3 0.60 0.10 98% 25% 14% 0.01 0.39
4e-2 0.21 0.32 99% 85% 63% 0.02 0.90
8e-2 0.06 0.53 99% 96% 83% 0.03 1.44
DANet [10]
8e-3 0.79 0.08 99% 16% 12% 0.02 0.56
4e-2 0.43 0.28 99% 62% 50% 0.03 1.32
8e-2 0.13 0.54 99% 90% 79% 0.035 1.95
DRNet [43]
8e-3 0.63 0.10 99% 16% 10% 0.02 0.65
4e-2 0.24 0.37 99% 60% 48% 0.06 2.14
8e-2 0.13 0.45 99% 76% 65% 0.08 3.02
U-Net [38]
8e-3 0.32 0.17 99% 36% 25% 0.02 0.70
4e-2 0.05 0.32 98% 85% 66% 0.08 2.76
8e-2 0.02 0.43 98% 95% 79% 0.09 3.43
Table 9: Indirect Attacks on Cityscapes to fool dynamic classes while perturbing entire static ones with `2 strategy. The perceptibility
values of `2 attack are much lower when compared to `∞ attack at a given success rate of attack. Same as the case in `∞ attack, FCN is
more robust to indirect attacks while PSANet and PSPNet are relatively more vulnerable to `2 attacks.
Networks d mIoU mASR Norm of δ
mIoUfu mIoU
f
t mASR
p
u mASR
f
u mASR
f
t `∞-norm `2-norm
FCN [26]
50 0.77 0.05 100% 4% 3% 0.38 43.37
100 0.98 0.00 100% 0% 0% 0.38 33.46
150 1.00 0.00 100% 0% 0% 0.38 22.23
PSPNet [46]
50 0.14 0.37 99% 96% 74% 0.28 41.83
100 0.24 0.26 98% 86% 60% 0.29 33.00
150 0.55 0.12 97% 35% 23% 0.34 22.86
PSANet [47]
50 0.11 0.33 98% 98% 72% 0.25 42.11
100 0.13 0.27 98% 97% 65% 0.25 33.00
150 0.28 0.21 98% 75% 47% 0.30 22.47
DANet [10]
50 0.14 0.50 99% 92% 81% 0.29 41.17
100 0.48 0.24 98% 53% 43% 0.33 34.50
150 0.80 0.07 98% 14% 10% 0.35 23.45
DRNet [43]
50 0.37 0.20 99% 34% 22% 0.43 46.30
100 0.73 0.05 99% 5% 3% 0.44 37.24
150 0.94 0.00 100% 0% 0% 0.47 25.87
U-Net [38]
50 0.01 0.25 98% 97% 70% 0.43 44.62
100 0.03 0.20 96% 90% 60% 0.47% 39.61
150 0.10 0.17 95% 74% 47% 0.49% 33.27
Table 10: Impact of Local Attacks by perturbing pixels that are at least d pixels away from any dynamic class with `∞ strategy. We
observe PSANet [47] and UNet [38] more vulnerable to indirect attacks when perturbations at large distances such d = 150 while FCN [26]
is barely effected.
Networks d mIoU mASR Norm of δ
mIoUfu mIoU
f
t mASR
p
u mASR
f
u mASR
f
t `∞-norm `2-norm
FCN [26]
50 0.80 0.05 100% 3% 3% 0.31 10.71
100 0.98 0.00 100% 0% 0% 0.32 9.95
150 1.00 0.00 100% 0% 0% 0.40 9.43
PSPNet [46]
50 0.18 0.35 99% 94% 73% 0.13 9.58
100 0.30 0.24 98% 78% 56% 0.16 9.70
150 0.59 0.11 98% 29% 20% 0.24 9.65
PSANet [47]
50 0.10 0.37 99% 98% 76% 0.19 9.41
100 0.14 0.29 98% 95% 67% 0.22 9.43
150 0.31 0.21 98% 70% 45% 0.27 9.55
DANet [10]
50 0.27 0.40 99% 83% 72% 0.19 9.90
100 0.67 0.15 98% 33% 26% 0.22 9.87
150 0.85 0.05 98% 10% 7% 0.30 9.51
DRNet [43]
50 0.44 0.15 99% 30% 17% 0.31 12.55
100 0.77 0.04 99% 5% 3% 0.32 12.23
150 0.95 0.00 100% 0% 0% 0.37 11.50
U-Net [38]
50 0.02 0.23 98% 95% 67% 0.28 16.13
100 0.12 0.16 95% 68% 42% 0.58 19.51
150 0.12 0.16 95% 67% 42% 0.58 19.56
Table 11: Impact of Local Attacks by perturbing pixels that are at least d pixels away from any dynamic class with `2 strategy. We
observe PSANet [47] and UNet [38] more vulnerable to indirect attacks when perturbations at large distances such d = 150 while FCN [26]
is barely effected.
Networks Sparsity mIoU mASR Norm of δ
mIoUfu mIoU
f
t mASR
p
u mASR
f
u mASR
f
t `∞-norm `2-norm
FCN [26]
75% 0.52 0.12 100% 18% 13% 0.15 4.04
85% 0.67 0.07 100% 9% 6% 0.14 3.11
90% 0.73 0.05 100% 6% 4% 0.12 2.54
95% 0.84 0.03 100% 2% 2% 0.10 1.78
PSPNet [46]
75% 0.19 0.38 99% 89% 71% 0.09 4.87
85% 0.32 0.28 98% 74% 55% 0.11 5.25
90% 0.42 0.21 98% 60% 42% 0.13 5.30
95% 0.60 0.11 98% 33% 22% 0.15 4.85
PSANet [47]
75% 0.10 0.44 99% 97% 79% 0.09 4.76
85% 0.16 0.38 98% 94% 71% 0.10 5.20
90% 0.20 0.32 98% 89% 64% 0.12 5.19
95% 0.36 0.22 98% 70% 44% 0.14 5.07
DANet [10]
75% 0.30 0.37 99% 78% 65% 0.12 5.63
85% 0.49 0.23 99% 57% 46% 0.14 5.79
90% 0.64 0.16 99% 40% 30% 0.15 5.80
95% 0.71 0.12 99% 29% 21% 0.13 3.95
DRNet [43]
75% 0.42 0.19 100% 35% 22% 0.18 5.40
85% 0.55 0.11 100% 22% 13% 0.15 4.43
90% 0.63 0.08 100% 15% 10% 0.14 3.84
95% 0.77 0.05 100% 8% 5% 0.13 2.81
U-Net [38]
75% 0.12 0.20 96% 70% 44% 0.15 6.56
85% 0.19 0.15 96% 52% 32% 0.19 6.81
90% 0.25 0.13 96% 42% 25% 0.22 6.54
95% 0.36 0.11 96% 27% 16% 0.23 5.73
Table 12: Adaptive Indirect Local Attacks on Cityscapes. We compute the performance statistics for different sparsity levels of pertur-
bation region. By enforcing group sparsity prior, we can attack context-aware networks such as PSANet [47], PSPNet [46] and DANet [10]
at relatively higher success rate than baseline FCN [26].
Networks Patch size
h×w (area%)
mIoU mASR Norm of δ
mIoUfu mASR
f
u `∞-norm `2-norm
FCN [26]
51× 102 (1.0%) 0.86 2% 0.30 25.36
76× 157 (2.3%) 0.78 4% 0.30 37.60
102× 204 (4.0%) 0.73 10% 0.30 51.80
153× 306 (9.0%) 0.58 18% 0.30 78.32
PSPNet [46]
51× 102 (1.0%) 0.80 3% 0.30 25.52
76× 157 (2.3%) 0.63 10% 0.30 38.43
102× 204 (4.0%) 0.44 27% 0.30 50.32
153× 306 (9.0%) 0.09 84% 0.30 74.92
PSANet [47]
51× 102 (1.0%) 0.41 38% 0.30 26.69
76× 157 (2.3%) 0.23 60% 0.30 38.60
102× 204 (4.0%) 0.14 71% 0.30 50.39
153× 306 (9.0%) 0.04 90% 0.30 78.02
DANet [10]
51× 102 (1.0%) 0.79 4% 0.30 26.45
76× 157 (2.3%) 0.71 10% 0.30 37.24
102× 204 (4.0%) 0.65 15% 0.30 49.86
153× 306 (9.0%) 0.40 42% 0.30 74.60
DRNet [43]
51× 102 (1.0%) 0.82 2% 0.30 26.28
76× 157 (2.3%) 0.77 7% 0.30 39.27
102× 204 (4.0%) 0.70 14% 0.30 52.23
153× 306 (9.0%) 0.55 28% 0.30 78.32
U-Net [38]
51× 102 (1.0%) 0.32 26% 0.30 29.95
76× 157 (2.3%) 0.13 58% 0.30 44.42
102× 204 (4.0%) 0.06 76% 0.30 58.15
153× 306 (9.0%) 0.02 90% 0.30 86.06
Table 13: Universal Local Attacks on Cityscapes by tuning the patch size h×w (area%) on different networks. PSANet [47] and
UNet [38] are highly sensitive to patch attacks even when the patch is 1% of image area. Note that the attack is untargeted and aimed to
fool entire scene by placing a fixed size at the center of image. We use `∞ based attack with α = 0.001 and  = 0.3.
Networks Perturbationregion
Fooling
region
Norm of δ Misclassified
pixels %
Global AUROC Local AUROC
`∞ `2 SC [41] / Re-Syn [23] / Ours Ours
FCN [26]
Global Full 0.09 17.67 91% 1.00 / 1.00 / 0.94 0.90
FS Dyn
0.001 0.83 1% 0.48 / 0.53 / 0.89 0.80
0.01 4.70 5% 0.54 / 0.67 / 1.00 0.83
0.10 15.12 9% 0.65 / 0.75 / 1.00 0.83
0.40 50.93 10% 0.93 / 0.76 / 1.00 0.73
0.02 0.58 2% 0.51 / 0.56 / 0.58 0.83
0.05 1.75 5% 0.55 / 0.67 / 0.82 0.86
0.08 2.58 6% 0.57/ 0.71 / 0.90 0.87
UP Full
0.30 25.46 2% 0.70 / 0.55 / 0.88 0.96
0.30 37.60 4% 0.82 / 0.64 / 1.00 0.94
0.30 51.80 10% 0.90 / 0.75 / 1.00 0.94
0.30 7.32 18% 0.99 / 0.94 / 1.00 0.95
AP Dyn
0.15 4.04 3% 0.68 / 0.65 / 0.92 0.88
0.14 3.11 2% 0.61 / 0.57 / 0.87 0.89
0.12 2.54 1% 0.60 / 0.55 / 0.80 0.90
0.10 1.78 1% 0.60 / 0.52 / 0.73 0.91
Table 14: Attack detection on Cityscapes with different perturbation settings on FCN [26]. We perform mahalanobis based attack
detection in four settings namely Global:Global image perturbations, UP:Universal patch perturbations; FS : Full static class perturbations.
. We tune the noise level or patch size or sparsity levels of attack generation process to achieve different range of success rate. As observed,
SC [41] and Re-Syn [23] perform well only when large percentage of pixels are misclassified while we outperform them by a large margin
in all other settings.
Networks Perturbationregion
Fooling
region
Norm of δ Misclassified
pixels %
Global AUROC Local AUROC
`∞ `2 SC [41] / Re-Syn [23] / Ours Ours
PSPNet [46]
Global Full 0.06 10.74 83% 0.90 / 1.00 / 0.99 0.81
FS Dyn
0.001 0.77 3% 0.49 / 0.56 / 1.00 0.84
0.01 3.10 14% 0.48 / 0.76 / 1.00 0.90
0.05 8.30 14% 0.52 / 0.77 / 1.00 0.85
0.20 37.99 14% 0.88 / 0.78 / 1.00 0.88
0.01 0.51 4% 0.50 / 0.59 / 1.00 0.85
0.02 1.28 12% 0.52 / 0.72 / 1.00 0.87
0.03 1.17 14% 0.52 / 0.73 / 1.00 0.87
UP Full
0.30 25.52 3% 0.57 / 0.55 / 1.00 0.93
0.30 38.43 10% 0.62 / 0.70 / 1.00 0.96
0.30 50.32 27% 0.65 / 0.89 / 1.00 0.96
0.30 74.92 84% 0.87 / 1.00 / 1.00 0.97
AP Dyn
0.09 4.87 12% 0.65 / 0.82 / 0.99 0.90
0.11 5.25 10% 0.59 / 0.76 / 0.98 0.82
0.13 5.30 9% 0.56 / 0.72 / 0.99 0.82
0.15 4.85 5 % 0.55 / 0.69 / 1.00 0.84
Table 15: Attack detection on Cityscapes with different perturbation settings on PSPNet [46]. We perform mahalanobis based attack
detection in four settings namely Global:Global image perturbations, UP:Universal patch perturbations; FS : Full static class perturbations.
We tune the noise level or patch size or sparsity levels of attack generation process to achieve different range of success rate. As observed,
SC [41] and Re-Syn [23] perform well only when large percentage of pixels are misclassified while we outperform them by a large margin
in all other settings.
Networks Perturbationregion
Fooling
region
Norm of δ Misclassified
pixels %
Global AUROC Local AUROC
`∞ `2 SC [41] / Re-Syn [23] / Ours Ours
PSANet [47]
Global Full 0.04 8.26 93% 0.90 / 1.00 / 0.94 0.75
FS Dyn
0.001 0.72 4% 0.49 / 0.56 / 1.00 0.88
0.01 2.68 14% 0.48 / 0.77 / 1.00 0.92
0.05 8.10 14% 0.50 / 0.78 / 1.00 0.89
0.18 35.71 14% 0.87 / 0.78 / 1.00 0.87
0.01 0.39 4% 0.51 / 0.57 / 1.00 0.88
0.02 0.90 13% 0.49 / 0.73 / 1.00 0.92
0.03 1.44 14% 0.49 / 0.77 / 1.00 0.92
UP Full
0.30 26.69 38% 0.60 / 1.00 / 1.00 0.99
0.30 38.60 60% 0.62 / 1.00 / 1.00 0.98
0.30 50.39 71% 0.69 / 1.00 / 1.00 0.97
0.30 78.02 90% 0.85 / 1.00 / 1.00 0.98
AP Dyn
0.09 4.76 14% 0.54 / 0.85 / 1.00 0.95
0.10 5.20 14% 0.52 / 0.83 / 1.00 0.94
0.12 5.19 13% 0.54 / 0.81 / 1.00 0.92
0.14 5.07 10% 0.52 / 0.78 / 0.94 0.91
Table 16: Attack detection on Cityscapes with different perturbation settings on PSANet [47]. We perform mahalanobis based attack
detection in four settings namely Global:Global image perturbations, UP:Universal patch perturbations; FS : Full static class perturbations.
. We tune the noise level or patch size or sparsity levels of attack generation process to achieve different range of success rate. As observed,
SC [41] and Re-Syn [23] perform well only when large percentage of pixels are misclassified while we outperform them by a large margin
in all other settings.
Networks Perturbationregion
Fooling
region
Norm of δ Misclassified
pixels %
Global AUROC Local AUROC
`∞ `2 SC [41] / Re-Syn [23] / Ours Ours
DANet [10]
Global Full 0.06 12.55 82% 0.89 / 1.00 / 1.00 0.68
FS Dyn
0.01 0.81 1% 0.50 / 0.51 / 0.64 0.88
0.01 3.90 14% 0.52 / 0.72 / 0.96 0.86
0.04 8.30 14% 0.56 / 0.74 / 0.99 0.92
0.15 31.71 14% 0.84 / 0.75 / 1.00 0.94
0.02 0.56 3% 0.50 / 0.54 / 0.67 0.86
0.03 1.32 9% 0.48 / 0.64 / 0.89 0.86
0.03 1.95 14% 0.50 / 0.70 / 0.87 0.88
UP Full
0.30 26.45 4% 0.74 / 0.57 / 0.77 0.89
0.30 37.24 10% 0.80 / 0.64 / 0.92 0.83
0.30 49.86 15% 0.73 / 0.75 / 0.99 0.87
0.30 74.60 42% 0.88 / 0.92 / 1.00 0.89
AP Dyn
0.12 5.63 12% 0.58 / 0.75 / 0.99 0.82
0.14 5.79 9% 0.54 / 0.68 / 0.99 0.82
0.15 5.80 6% 0.50 / 0.63 / 0.95 0.81
0.13 3.95 5% 0.51 / 0.58 / 0.85 0.83
Table 17: Attack detection on Cityscapes with different perturbation settings on DANet [10]. We perform mahalanobis based attack
detection in four settings namely Global:Global image perturbations, UP:Universal patch perturbations; FS : Full static class perturbations.
. We tune the noise level or patch size or sparsity levels of attack generation process to achieve different range of success rate. As observed,
SC [41] and Re-Syn [23] perform well only when large percentage of pixels are misclassified while we outperform them by a large margin
in all other settings.
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Figure 6: Indirect Attacks on Cityscapes to fool dynamic classes while perturbing complete static ones using `2 and `∞ attack. We use
α = {8e-3, 4e-2, 8e-2} for `2 attacks and α={1e-5, 1e-4, 1e-3, 5e-3} for `∞ attacks. We observe that PGD [3] is efficient in computing
an imperceptible perturbations for different ranges of step-size α.
Networks Sparsity mIoU mASR Norm of δ
mIoUfu mIoU
f
t mASR
p
u mASR
f
u mASR
f
t `∞-norm `2-norm
FCN [26]
75% 0.50 0.32 100% 35% 32% 0.14 2.40
85% 0.58 0.27 100% 30% 27% 0.13 2.15
90% 0.66 0.22 100% 24% 22% 0.12 1.91
95% 0.80 0.12 100% 13% 13% 0.11 1.37
PSANet [47]
75% 0.29 0.68 99% 70% 68% 0.07 1.77
85% 0.22 0.78 98% 79% 78% 0.07 1.93
90% 0.20 0.80 98% 82% 80% 0.08 2.21
95% 0.30 0.69 99% 70% 68% 0.13 2.81
Table 18: Adaptive Indirect Local Attacks on PASCAL VOC. We observe that PSANet [47] is more vulnerable to local adaptive attacks
than FCN [26].
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Figure 7: Indirect Local attack on different networks with perturbations at least d pixels away from any dynamic class. In
most cases, FCN [26] is not effected to indirect attacks while PSANet [47], PSPNet [46] and DANet [10] are effected due to
larger contextual dependencies for prediction.
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Figure 8: Universal Local Attacks on segmentation networks. The degradation in FCN [26] is limited to the attacked area,
whereas for context-aware networks, such as PSPNet [46], PSANet [47], DANet [10], it extends to far away regions.
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Figure 9: Adaptive Indirect Local Attacks on Cityscapes with different networks by tuning the sparsity levels. We
observe that PSPNet [46] and PSANet [47] are most vulnerbale to adaptive indirect local attacks even with perturbations
with high levels of sparsity while FCN [26] is least effected.
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Figure 10: Visualizing internal subspaces of normal and adversarial samples of Cityscapes with PSPNet [46]. For each
spatial location of the extracted feature map at layer `, we assign the label of nearest pre-trained class-conditional distribution
computed using mahalanobis distance. As shown in figure, the nearest cluster label almost looks same as the predicted label
map for clean samples however for adversarial samples, the nearest cluster moves towards the predicted adversarial label in
final layers. Also, in the context PSP layer, the nearest conditional distribution values are completely erroneous and far away
from normal cluster assignments for adversarial samples.
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Figure 11: Visualizing internal subspaces of normal and adversarial samples of Cityscapes with PSANet [47]. For each
spatial location of the extracted feature map at layer `, we assign the label of nearest pre-trained class-conditional distribution
computed using mahalanobis distance. As shown in figure, the nearest cluster label almost looks same as the predicted label
map for clean samples however for adversarial samples, the nearest cluster moves towards the predicted adversarial label in
final layers. Also, in the context PSA layer, the nearest conditional distribution values are completely erroneous and far away
from normal cluster assignments for adversarial samples.
(a) Adversarial image (b) Fooling mask (GT) (c) Predicted  mask
Figure 12: Visualization of attack detection at pixel level by adaptive Indirect Local Attacks on Cityscapes with
PSANet [47]. The first column shows the adversarial image, second column shows the ground truth fooling positions and the
third column the predicted fooling positions.
(c) Normal  Seg. (d) Adversarial  Seg.(a) Adversarial image (b) Perturbation
Figure 13: Adaptive Indirect Local Attacks on PASCAL VOC with PSANet [47]. The first column shows an adversarial
image (a) perturbed an imperceptible noise (b) at local background regions mis-classifies the foreground label in normal
segmentation map (c) as the background ones shown in (d).
